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A Square Deal? Mining Costs, Mining Royalties and Local Government in New 
South Wales, Australia 
Abstract: Mining operations are often controversial since they can impose significant 
external costs on the local municipalities and local inhabitants. Under current 
legislative arrangements in New South Wales (NSW), Australia, local governments are 
constrained from recouping costs directly from mines by means of increased property 
taxes on mines due to state-wide limitations on tax increases – known colloquially as 
the ‘rate-cap’. Moreover, mining royalties are paid directly to the NSW government 
and not to affected councils. In this paper, set against the background of mining 
activities in NSW, we estimate the magnitude of costs imposed by mining operations 
on rural and regional local authorities. We then offer alternative public policy 
solutions which would enable affected municipalities to recoup some or all of the cost 
burden placed on them by mining operations in their respective local government 
areas. 
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1. Introduction 
Australia is blessed by considerable mineral wealth and it has become a major exporter of both 
energy commodities, especially coal, liquefied natural gas and uranium, as well as minerals, notably 
iron ore, gold and base metals (ABARES, 2016). Under the Australian Constitution, mineral reserves 
are owned by state and territory governments, which assign both exploration and production rights 
to mining companies, and then levy resource taxes or royalties on these companies (Henry et al, 
2010; Blackwell and Dollery, 2013). A substantial literature exists on the taxation of minerals in 
Australia (see, for example, Ergas, Harrison and Pincus, 2010; Ergas and Pincus, 2014; Freebairn, 
2012; 2015; Garnaut, 2010; and Hogan, 2012), which mostly focuses on the evaluation of existing 
taxes and developing improved methods of taxation. One strand considers differences between the 
regulatory regimes of the different states and territories (Cronshaw and Grafton, 2016), which can 
affect the impact of mining.1  
                                                          
1 Though not the main focus of this article, negative mining impacts can be moderated through a 
Social License to Operate (SLO), a social contract to mine with at least the implied approval of the 





A number of scholars, including Battellino (2010) and Robson (2015), have considered the economic, 
environmental and social effects of the recent Australian mining boom. Although much of the 
scholarly literature directed at the mining boom has focused on its macroeconomic impact (see, for 
instance, McKissack, Chang, Ewing and Rahman, 2008; Downes, Hanslow and Tulip, 2014; Knop and 
Vespignani, 2014; Bashar, 2015; Fleming, Measham and Paredes, 2015; Fleming and Measham, 
2015), some work has also examined the impact of the boom at the regional and local levels. For 
example, Perry and Rowe (2015) examined the effects of ‘fly-in fly-out’ workers on local 
communities, Blackwell and Dollery (2014) considered the effects of mining expenditure on local 
economies, Fleming and Measham (2014) investigated the local job multipliers attendant upon 
mining, Blackwell, Fischer, McFarlane and Dollery (2015) empirically analysed employment leakage 
by Local Government Area (LGA) in the Northern Territory, Petrova and Marinova (2013) evaluated 
the social impact of mining, and Garnett and Lewis (2007) studied demographic and employment 
shifts contingent upon mining. 
In addition, some scholars have considered the impact of mining on local government in regional 
and remote Australia. For instance, Cheshire, Everingham and Lawrence (2014) examined the 
challenges posed by mining. Similarly, Loechel, Hodgkinson and Moffat (2013) studied climate 
change mitigation at the local level. However, to date no work has examined empirically the financial 
impact of mining operations on local authorities responsible for their LGAs in terms of revenue and 
expenditure.  
In this paper we seek to address this gap in the literature by investigating municipal operational 
expenses contingent on mining in New South Wales (NSW) local government over the period 2012 
to 2015 inclusive. We also offer alternative public policy proposals which would allow local 
authorities negatively affected by mining operations to recoup some or all of the cost burden placed 
on them by mining in their respective local government areas. Given that the NSW Government (i.e. 
the government of the state of NSW) has the exclusive power to levy taxes on mining, we are thus 
concerned with the fiscal relationship between the NSW and its local government system.  
The paper is divided into four main areas. Section 2 provides a brief synoptic review of both the NSW 
local government system as well as the mining industry in NSW by way of institutional background. 
Section 3 outlines the data and empirical methodology employed in the paper and the results of the 
empirical estimations are considered in section 4. The paper ends in section 5 with a discussion of 
                                                                                                                                                                                    






the policy implications of the analysis 
2. Institutional Background 
2.1 New South Wales Local Government 
Under the Australian Constitution, Australia is a federal state with a national government, has six 
states and two territories. The ownership of mineral resources under the surface resides with state 
and territory governments, including the capacity to impose taxes on the exploitation of these 
resources. Apart from the Australian Capital Territory, containing the national capital city Canberra, 
each of the seven states and territories has its own local government system. In terms of the 
Constitution, each local government system falls under its own state government. In general, state 
governments exercise decisive powers over local government, including the ability to abolish or 
forcibly merge local councils.  
Prior to its recent structural reform through forced municipal mergers2, NSW local government 
compromised 152 ‘general purpose councils’ (referred to as Local Government Areas for statistical 
purposes), 12 ‘special purpose councils’ and the NSW Aboriginal Land Council. NSW local councils 
are overseen by the NSW Office of Local Government, the NSW Independent Pricing and Regulatory 
Tribunal (IPART), NSW Local Government Grants Commission and various other ancillary bodies 
falling under the NSW Local Government Act (1993). Relative to most other advanced nations, 
Australian local government systems, including NSW, provide a limited range of functions largely 
focused on ‘services to property’. In particular, NSW councils deliver local infrastructure, including 
local roads, and local services, like sewage and solid waste disposal, with some regional councils 
operating local water utilities. NSW local government is financed through a combination of property 
taxes (‘rates’), fees and charges, intergovernmental grants, developer charges and some other minor 
sources of income. Its financial latitude is severely constrained by a longstanding rate-capping policy 
by the NSW Government which imposes upper limits on aggregate increases in property taxes. Local 
councils fall under elected councillors and (usually) indirectly elected mayors, who face four-year 
                                                          
2 The NSW structural reforms were forced amalgamations predicated on financial sustainability (and 
associated metrics). Nineteen new councils were created through forced amalgamation in May 
2016, however, a number of other planned amalgamations were eventually aborted due to 
successful Court action. Some of the councils which were merged to enhance financial 
sustainability had extensive mining activity (e.g. Gloucester, NSW) which means that any 
uncompensated burden imposed as a result of hosting mining operations may have contributed 





electoral periods. The operational side of councils is run by a general manager overseeing a local 
bureaucracy.  
2.2 Mining and Mine Revenue in New South Wales 
Mining in NSW began with the discovery of coal in Newcastle in the 1790s and spread to the Illawara 
region with its high grade coking coal in 1848 (NSW Minerals Council, 2013a). From the late 1800’s 
onwards, Newcastle and Wollongong developed into fully-fledged ports, exporting minerals from 
inland towns as far as Broken Hill (NSW Mineral Council, 2013a). Coal fields today run through NSW 
to the Queensland border.  
 
In 1851, gold was discovered near Orange (NSW Minerals Council, 2013a). Caldia Hill was the 
first gold and copper mining operation in 1870 and it continues as one of the largest gold mines in 
Australia (NSW Minerals Council, 2013a). Regional towns whose development centred on mining 
include Newcastle, Broken Hill, Wollongong, Cessnock, Mussellbrook, Singleton, Lithgow, Orange, 
Gunnedah and Cobar. Figure 1 provides a spatial perspective on contemporary mining in NSW by 
numbers of mines and mineral types: 
 






Figure 2: Major mines, mining titles and gas wells with LGA boundaries in NSW. Source: Derived from 
Common Ground (2017) 
The NSW mining industry is economically important in its own right. For instance, Newcastle 
is currently the world’s largest coal export port (NSW Minerals Council, 2013a). In aggregate, NSW 
mining production in 2011-12 generated $27billion (Australian dollars; Office of Chief Economist, 
2014, p. 23). Figure 2 shows the overlap of mining with local government authority (LGA) boundaries 
as well as a broad indication of LGA mining assessment activity (‘assessment’ is the term used in 
Australia to describe the notice of local government taxation liability – as such, assessments reflect 
the number of properties, in this case mining properties, in a given LGA). 
NSW mining is significant in the overall national context. Table 1 contains Australian mining 
royalties by state for 2015-16. NSW accrues some $1.2 billion (or 15 percent of total royalties in 
Australia at almost $8 billion). NSW royalties are predominantly derived from coal production, in 
common with Queensland, but in contrast to Western Australia where iron ore is the major 
contributor. 





State/territory Royalty revenue ($m) Percent of Total (%) 
Western Australia a 4,134 52% 
Queensland b 2,173 27% 
New South Wales c 1,187 15% 
Northern Territory d 194 2% 
South Australia e 222 3% 
Tasmania f 28 0.4% 
Victoria g 48 0.6% 
Australian Capital Territory h 0 0% 
Total 7,986 100% 
Sources and notes: State or territory government budgets 2016-17: a. Government of Western Australia, 2016, calculated 
from p. 89; b. Queensland Treasury, 2016, p. 100; c. NSW Government, 2016, p. A4-6; d. NT Government, 2016, p. 56; e. SA 
Government, 2016, p. 53; f. Tasmanian Government, 2016, p. 98; g. Victorian Government, 2016, p. 164; h. ACT 
Government, 2016 (not in budget). 
Table 2 shows that NSW mining accounts for 18 percent of all Australian mining employment  
at 41,000 people. NSW royalties account for 15 percent of total Australian royalties and NSW 
accounted for 28 percent of the gross value of mineral production in Australia in 2011-12. 
Under constitutional law, the NSW Government owns all mineral resources in NSW (NSW 
Mineral Council, 2013c). Royalties from mining enter consolidated revenue and are used to fund 
general outlays, such as education and health, which are expended predominantly in metropolitan, 
not rural areas. There is thus a mismatch between where the resource is extracted and where its 
royalties expended, sometimes termed the ‘resource-return mismatch’.  
In NSW, a Resources Regulator is responsible for the enforcement of the Mining Act as well 
as regulating safety and health in NSW mining (NSW Department of Industry: Resources and Energy, 
2017a). By contrast, the Environment and Protection Authority regulates coal seam gas exploration 
and production activities, with the exception of work health and safety matters (O’Kane, 2014). 
Table 2: Selected Economic Measures for NSW and Australia 
Measure NSW Australian total NSW/Australia (%) Relevant year 





Mining Employment (000’s) a 41 232 18% Nov 2016 
Gross State Product ($ billion) c 531 1,662 32% 2015-16 
Mineral Production ($ billion) d 27 202 13% 2011-12 
State Taxes ($ billion) e 26 93 28% 2015-16 (Vic 2016-17) 
Sources and notes: a. ABS, 2016a; b. See Table 1 for sources; c. Chain Volume Measures, derived, ABS, 2016b; d. Gross 
Value, Office of Chief Economist, 2014, p. 23 e. Calculated from state/territory budgets as referenced in Table 1: WA p. 77, 
Qld p. 85, NSW p. A1-7, NT p. 17, SA p. 143, Tas p. 78; ACT p. 226. 
In all Australian states and territories, rights to access land, water and minerals are 
separated, thereby providing the benefits of sequential and multiple use. However, unintended 
consequences may result, such as water table pollution or insufficient funds to rehabilitate closed 
mines. These deleterious unintended consequences are typically born by those communities where 
a given mine is located. This matching of resource extraction and bearing its unintended 
consequences may be termed the ‘resource-consequences match’. Taken together, the ‘resource-
returns mismatch’ and ‘resource-consequences match’ typically mean local non-metropolitan 
regions bear a considerable overlooked burden from mining activity.3 Under current fiscal 
arrangements, property taxes charged by local authorities in affected areas are employed for 
addressing this problem, as well as the impost of mining operations on local infrastructure, such as 
roads and bridges, in regional and rural areas. It is thus vital from a public policy perspective to 
determine empirically the fiscal burden borne by local authorities as a consequence of mining 
activities in their LGAs.  This forms a major objective of this paper.  
3. Data and Empirical Methodology 
The model which we employed for this analysis was consistent with a large body of empirical work 
on Local Government expenditure functions (see, Drew, Kortt and Dollery, 2014 for a comprehensive 
review of this literature), and is given by: 
Eit = αi + β1Ait + β2Xit + μit      t=1...4 (equation 1) 
                                                          
3 While the mining industry has developed the quasi-instrument of Social License to Operate 
(Fordham, Robinson and Blackwell, 2017) to mitigate any adverse impacts from mining, this 
‘contract’ may involve direct and private royalty payments from the miner to the specific local 
community (Blackwell and Dollery, 2013). This implied license is a voluntary mechanism however, 






Where E is the operating expenditure per capita, A is a vector of assessment data (number 
of mining, business, farm and residential assessments – reflecting the number of each type of 
property – issued by the local government entity), X is a vector of control variables (i.e. average 
income of taxable individuals, proportion of individuals under 15 years of age, proportion of 
individuals over 65 years of age, proportion of individuals on a disability pension, proportion of 
individuals receiving Newstart welfare benefit, proportion of individuals identifying as Aboriginal or 
Torres Strait Islander, proportion of individuals speaking a language other than English at home, 
length of council sealed roads, length of council unsealed roads and population density) and μ is an 
idiosyncratic error. The subscript it refers to the ith council entity and the tth year. Log 
transformations are standard practice where skewness occurs in regressands and regressors and 
only skewed variables were transformed (with the principal aim of ensuring normal residuals; 
transformations are noted in Table 3). 
Table 3 provides details of the data employed to model the association between number of mining 
assessments and per capita operating expenditure in NSW local government areas. Operating 
expenditure was obtained directly from the audited financial statements for each of the 152 local 
governments for each of the four periods from 2011-12 to 2014-15 inclusive. Road length data was 
obtained from the relevant NSW Local Government Grants Commission (2012; 2013; 2014; 2015) 
reports. Number of assessments (by rating class – mining, business, farm and residential) was 
obtained from the Office of Local Government (2015) Time Series Data report. The Australian Bureau 
of Statistics (ABS) (2017) National Regional Profile was consulted for the remainder of the data. 
Moreover, it must be stressed that 2015 was the most recent year for which ABS data was available: 
it thus represented the upper temporal limit for the modelling undertaken in the paper. Local 
government areas of councils are a statistical boundary used by the Australian Bureau of Statistics. 
Table 3: Estimation Variables Employed (Figures are for Raw Data) 
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Fixed-effects panel regression was employed to examine the association between council 
expenditure and number of mining enterprises. Unlike other empirical methods, fixed-effects 
regression controls for time invariant variables: this means that the model is not sensitive to time 
invariant omitted variables bias and avoiding omitted variable bias is considered by many scholars to 
be the most important attribute of panel data (see, for example, Kennedy, 2003). Moreover, an 
unfavourable Hausman test meant that we could not be confident that the composite error was 
uncorrelated with the explanatory variables (thereby indicating that random-effects regression was 
inadvisable)4. Thus, fixed-effects regression was the best empirical method available to investigate 
the four years of available data across the 152 NSW local authorities.  
Explanatory variables employed (number of mining, business, farm and residential 
assessments) are justified on the basis that local authorities provide different services which 
generally reflect the different rating categories employed for NSW local governments. For example, 
business assessments might be associated with specific expenditures, such as economic 
development, safety and hygiene inspections, and street-scaping, whilst farm assessments are 
generally associated with both limited services, typically implying no garbage collection, water or 
sewerage, and a low quality of services, often including unsealed roads. In this paper, our principal 
                                                          
4 Indeed, the fixed effects estimator (unlike random effects which is only reasonable for a limited 
number of cases) is always a reasonable thing to do ‘for regardless of the truth of the null 
[Hausman test], the fixed effects estimator is unbiased because it includes dummies for the 





focus falls on the association between mining assessments and local government expenditure. It has 
long been postulated that mining enterprises place a heavy additional burden on physical 
infrastructure, especially airports, water, sewerage, roads, as well as social infrastructure, including 
health, policing, recreation and welfare (McKenzie, 2013; Miller, van Megen and Buys, 2012). 
However, to date, there has been no statistically significant demonstration as to whether there is a 
direct burden imposed on local government operational expenditure as a result of the number of 
mining enterprises operated in a given LGA ceteris paribus. 
To ensure that we identify the burden specifically associated with the number of mining 
enterprises operating in a given LGA it is important that we control for variables known - from the 
scholarly literature - to affect local government expenditure. For instance, it widely recognised that 
the socio-economic status of residents is associated with the quantity and quality of local 
government goods and services demanded (see, for example, Drew and Dollery, 2016; Holcombe 
and Williams, 2009). Accordingly, we control for average wage of residents living in the LGA, the 
proportion of residents receiving a disability support pension and the proportion of residents 
receiving Newstart Allowance (welfare provided for unemployed persons of working age). We also 
control for the proportion of persons over the age of 65 (currently the age at which Australians 
become eligible for the Aged Pension) and children under the age of 15 (who are generally financial 
dependents). Both of these variables are routinely included as controls in regressions of local 
government expenditure because different age cohorts tend to demand and use different services 
(for instance, playgrounds and libraries for school-aged children, and Home-care and Aged-care for 
retirees (see, for example, Drew and Dollery, 2014a)). Population density is also controlled for in 
light of the fact that there is significant evidence that population density is negatively associated 
with the cost of providing local government services – that is the cost of some services, particularly 
services to property such as rubbish collection is likely to be inversely proportional to the distance 
travelled by rubbish trucks between properties (Drew and Dollery, 2015a). In addition, we also 
controlled for demographic variables attested to in the scholarly literature (proportion of Aboriginal 
and Torres Strait Islanders and proportion of persons who speak a language other than English at 
home – many local governments provide interpreters and other targeted services (such as art and 
culture centres, or remedial health programs) to these demographics). Our final controls employed 
length of council maintained roads (disaggregate to sealed (generally bitumen) and unsealed 
(generally graded dirt)) given that road construction and maintenance is the single largest 
expenditure item for councils in Australia (Drew and Dollery, 2014b). Indeed, the NSW Local 
Government Grant Commission (NSWLGGC, 2016, p. 42) reports that the average cost per kilometre 





half of this amount ($2,047.38). For a recent comprehensive introduction to Local Government 
expenditure determinants see (Grant and Drew, 2017). 
To provide further assurance we tested a number of regressions, employing additional 
controls, interaction terms and higher order terms. In particular it is important to note that 
regressions employing second-order assessment terms – which provide for the possibility of 
economies of scale in local government service provision – did not result in outputs with higher 
explanatory value (nor was the statistical significance or size of the coefficient markedly different). 
Thus, we do not report on regressions employing higher-order terms in the paper. This result is 
consistent with the evidence relating to economies of scale in Australian local government service 
provision which is mixed and inconclusive at best. For example, Fahey, Drew and Dollery (2016) 
provide a review of the empirical literature and produce econometric evidence which suggests that 
economies of scale are restricted to as few as three of the eleven common expenditure categories in 
NSW local government. We also replicated our fix-effects regressions employing an alternate 
regressand – expenditure per assessment – and found that the statistical significance of the 
regressor of interest was unchanged and the coefficient was only slightly altered. 
4. Results 
Table 4 summarises the results of three fixed-effects regressions conducted according to the 
empirical methodology detailed in section 3 of this paper (all appropriate tests were conducted on 
the model and alternate specifications were trialled to ensure robustness). In the first regression 
(Model 1) we tested the association for all 152 NSW local governments over the period 2011-12 to 
2014-15 inclusive. It is noteworthy that only one class of assessments – mining assessments – had a 
statistically significant association. The results suggest that, holding all other regressors constant, a 
ten percent increase in the number of mining assessments is associated with an additional 0.208% 
expenditure per capita.  
Table 4: Additional Per Capita Council Expenditure Associated with Mining Activity, 2011-12 to 2014-
15 (see appendix for details of all regressors) 
 Model 1:  
Per Capita Expenditure 
(ln) - Entire State  
Model 2:  
Per Capita Expenditure 
(ln) - Outside Sydney 
Metropolitan Area 
Model 3:  
Per Capita Expenditure 
(ln) - Councils with 
Mining Activity 




























Controls Yes Yes Yes 
Coefficient of 
Determination 
0.7483 0.6917 0.8237 
N 152 115 42 
Prob>F 0.0002 0.0360 0.0010 
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses. Significance levels: +p < 0.10, *p < 0.05, **p < 0.01. 
It could be argued that the results are confounded by the inclusion of Greater Sydney 
metropolitan councils, which do not host mining enterprises and typically provide a different mix 
and quality of services. For instance, Greater Sydney councils do not provide water or sewerage 
which is delivered instead through Sydney Water. Similarly, bridges, road surfaces, curbs, footpaths, 
and the like are generally provided at a higher quality than in many regional and rural areas. 
However, when we excluded Greater Sydney councils, the level of significance remained the same 
(at the 10% level of statistical significance) and the size of the coefficient increased marginally: 
holding all other regressors constant, a ten percent increase in the numbers of mining assessments 
was now associated with a 0.214 % increase in expenditure per capita (see Table 4, Model 2).  
In addition, it is worth stressing that there was no statistically significant association with 
other types of local government rating assessments. This furnishes strong empirical evidence that 
the presence of mining enterprises within local government areas outside of the Greater Sydney 
area does involve a statistically significant additional operational expenditure burden (in per capita 
terms). Extrapolating from this evidence, it is clear that a proposal to establish a mining enterprise in 
a local government area involves a direct and ongoing cost for the council in question. By way of 
contrast, there is no empirical evidence to suggest that establishing alternate commercial 
enterprises, such as retail outlets or agricultural ventures, might be associated with similar ongoing 





To clarify the expenditure implications faced by councils where a new mine has been 
approved, we conducted a third stratification consisting only of councils which have issued mining 
assessment notices over the period 2011-12 to 2014-15 inclusive. In this last regression, reported in 
Table 4 under Model 3, both the size and the statistical significance of the association increased 
markedly. In particular, we found that a ten percent increase to the number of mining assessments 
was associated - at the 1% level of statistical significance - with a 0.289% increase to per capita 
operational expenditure, ceteris paribus. Interpreting this association one should remain mindful of 
the fact that the typical population size and per capita operational expenditure for New South Wales 
councils hosting mining enterprises (as evidenced by the median5) was 13,534 persons and $1,710 
respectively. One should also be cognisant of the relatively low numbers of extant mining 
assessments, with the median number of mining assessments at 4, and the fact that this is ongoing 
additional operating expenditure. Moreover, the median value of mining assessments issued by local 
authorities over the period 2011-12 to 2014-15 was just $38,500. Indeed, it might be added that 
there is a great deal of variation in the size of the mining assessments issued, as evidenced by a wide 
interquartile range of $144,739. This suggests that, in many cases, the revenue received by a local 
council from mining enterprises does not cover the ongoing operational expenditure associated with 
the mine. 
However, it would be fallacious to surmise that the mining industry is not paying its fair 
share of taxation. Table 5 details the quantum of royalties paid to the NSW Government for the five 
financial years (2011-12 to 2015-16 inclusive) and contrasts this with the tax paid to local 
government. For the five financial years ending 2015-16, the NSW Government received an average 
of $1.3 billion dollars in royalties, whilst for the same period the average local government taxation 
(aggregated for all councils) was a mere $29 million. Put differently, local councils received just over 
two percent of the total quantum paid out by mining companies to the NSW Government. These 
disparities are compounded by the fact that the NSW Government assigns the royalty payments to 
consolidated revenue (NSW Department of Industry: Resources & Energy, 2017b). Thus, it is unlikely 
– in the absence of a programme which provides different levels of funding for rural communities 
which host mining enterprises – that the bulk of the royalties paid by mining companies are 
repatriated specifically to the communities with the purpose of providing a Coasian compensation 
for the costs and other negative externalities attested to in the literature (see, for example: 
Chapman, Tonts and Plummer, (2014), Franks, Brereton and Moran, (2014) and Miller, van Megen 
                                                          
5 Given the skewed distribution of council size and value of mining assessments issued the median is 





and Buys, (2012)). Indeed the NSW Local Government Grant Commission standardised expenditure 
allowances do not have a specific category for mining and mining is only mentioned in passing as 
one of a number of items under the category of Planning and Building services (which has an 
allowance of just $30.02 per unit of production which pales in comparison to other allowances such 
as road maintenance which as we have noted above runs into thousands of dollars per kilometre)6. 
  
                                                          
6 Moreover, the money being allocated by the NSWLGGC is sourced from the federal government, 





Table 5: Taxation Take NSW State and Local Government, 2011-12 to 2015-16 financial years (‘$m; 
proportion of take in parentheses) 
Year NSW State Royalty Take NSW Council Taxation  
Take 























Source: NSW Department of Industry: Resources & Energy (2017b) and the audited financial statements of New South 
Wales local governments. 
Moreover, it is by no means certain that the municipal rates paid by mining enterprises 
actually contribute additional revenue to affected local councils. This is due to the fact that the NSW 
Government has imposed local government property tax limitations in the form of an annual ‘rate-
peg’ since 1978 (Drew and Dollery, 2015b). It serves to impose a statutory ceiling on the increase to 
total local government rates revenue, which is set according to the ‘rate peg’ determined annually 
by the Independent Pricing and Regulatory Tribunal of New South Wales (IPART). The rate cap is 
typically low, often below the Consumer Price Index (CPI), and intended to reflect the local 
government cost index. For instance, the rate peg for the 2014-15 financial year was set at 2.3% 
(IPART, 2017). Thus, when an additional mining enterprise commences operations in a given local 
government area, the rates paid by the mine generally do not contribute additional revenue for the 
local government entity, but rather reduce the change in impost on other ratepayers. The only 
exception occurs where a local council applies to vary the total taxation take above the specified peg 
under a Special Rate Variation (SRV) application to IPART. 
SRV must be approved by IPART and may only be granted for periods of up to seven years. 





expenditure associated with the establishment of mines would need to overcome regulatory hurdles 
on a (maximum) seven-year cycle. In order to have an SRV approved, it is necessary for a council to 
demonstrate community awareness of the SRV application, provide evidence that there is a need for 
the increase, demonstrate that the impact on ratepayers is reasonable, provide evidence of a 
sustainable financing strategy and prove a ‘history of well-documented council productivity 
improvements’ (IPART, 2017).  Lodging an SRV application is thus far from a foregone conclusion, 
especially given that the mining industry might raise strong objections that a given SRV application 
would not have a reasonable impact on a particular class of ratepayers (mines). Indeed, of the six 
councils which had an increase in the number of mining assessments issued between 2011-12 and 
2012-13, only Wingecarribee Shire applied for a SRV for the 2013-14 financial year, which was 
approved by IPART, and none of these councils applied for a SRV for the 2014-15 financial year7. It 
thus seems that - in most instances - the establishment of a mine in a given LGA does not result in 
additional rates revenue for the council hosting the enterprise. 
NSW local authorities are placed in invidious circumstances whereby they are faced with 
ongoing additional operating expenditure directly associated with mining operations, but are 
prevented by NSW Government regulation from levying enduring additional rates to recoup at least 
some of the extra impost. As we can see from Table 5, the NSW Government simultaneously collects 
some 44 times the revenue derived from mining enterprises than local councils in NSW. However, 
royalties collected by the NSW Government are lumped into consolidated revenue, the bulk of which 
is spent in non-mining regions. These financial arrangements can hardly be described as equitable 
for mining companies, local communities and local authorities which host mining enterprises.  
5. Policy Implications  
The empirical analysis presented in this paper has demonstrated that mining operations in local 
government areas in NSW place a significant additional operational expenditure burden (in the order 
of 0.289% per capita for each ten percent increase to the number of mining enterprises) (see Model 
3 above) on local authorities in these areas and their local residents in per capita terms. Moreover, 
the establishment of a mine in a given LGA involves a direct and continuing cost on councils. While 
                                                          
7 We did not track the SRV applications through to the third year following issue of additional mine 
assessments because the year in question was subject to an extraordinary high volume of 
applications arising from conditions set by the state government as part of its Fit for the Future 





mining companies operating in NSW contribute substantial revenues by way of royalties to the NSW 
Government, only a small proportion of these funds is expended in those LGAs in which mines 
operate. This situation appears prima facie reasonable when one considers that many state services 
– such as health, education and policing – are delivered directly to persons. Thus one would 
anticipate that per capita expenditure by the NSW Government would fall largely in urban areas 
where the majority of the population reside. However, the situation appears far less reasonable if 
one reflects on the fact that the royalty revenue arising from mining is being effectively decoupled 
from the costs associated with mining. Put differently, one tier of government (i.e. the NSW state 
government) collects revenue from an economic activity, but it is another tier of government (i.e. 
NSW local government) which bears the (uncompensated) costs associated with the impact of 
mining in the local areas where it occurs. Moreover, there is some evidence to suggest that need is 
greater in rural and remote areas, than it might be for urban centres. For instance, 97.7% of urban 
local government roads are sealed, yet just 26.5% of rural and remote local government roads are 
sealed (the remainder are graded dirt). In a similar vein, many residents in rural and remote areas do 
not have access to sewer or mains water. Thus, quite apart from the matter of compensating 
councils for the costs associated with hosting mining activity, there would appear to be an argument 
for directing additional revenue (particularly mining revenue) to rural and remote communities to 
address need (specifically infrastructure shortfalls). 
We contend that two broad public policy solutions suggest themselves. In the first place, the NSW 
Government could reconsider its rate-capping policy which limits the capacity of local councils 
affected by mining operations to recoup the costs imposed on them by mining. Three alternative 
policy approaches appear feasible: (a) the NSW Government could simply dismantle its rate-pegging 
regime (which would affect all ratepayers in all NSW LGAs and not simply mining companies or 
mining LGAs) or at least exempt local authorities with mining operations in the LGAs from rate-
capping (which would only affect ratepayers in LGAs which have mining operations); (b) mining rates 
could be explicitly excluded from the rate-peg (which would only affect mining ratepayers in LGAs 
which host mines); or (c) a new SRV regime could be imposed directed at recovering costs from the 
mining companies themselves (which once again would only affect mining ratepayers in LGAs 
hosting mines). However, it is evident that (a) has the potential to create further inequity for all 
ratepayers (particularly those located in LGAs with mining operations), whilst (b) and (c) would result 
in higher imposts on mining companies which already pay significant royalties to the NSW 
Government (thus suggesting the problem of double taxing). Equity considerations thus suggest that 
if (b) or (c) were introduced, then mining companies should be able to offset local government 





taxing). This would ensure public policy intervention along the lines of (b) and (c), in particular, 
would not disadvantage mining enterprises. 
Secondly, the current NSW rate-pegging regulatory process, as well as the mining royalty regime, 
could be left in place and instead public policy remedies could focus on returning a calibrated 
proportion of mining royalties to the local authorities and local communities which host mining 
enterprises and accordingly bear the externalities attendant upon such mining operations. Two 
generic policy options suggest themselves. Firstly, a broad policy instrument could mirror the 
Western Australian (WA) Royalties for Regions program whereby a predetermined quantum of 
royalties are earmarked for regional local governments, regionally based non-government providers 
and regional incorporated associations (Department of Regional Development, 2017). Under the 
present Royalties for Regions program, $4 billion will be expended ‘over four years across regional 
Western Australia from 2015-16’ (Department of Regional Development, 2017). A remedy of this 
kind would distribute funds on the basis of generalised need rather than specifically seek to 
compensate given LGAs in proportion to external mining costs which they have had to bear. 
However, it should be stressed that the efficiency and equity properties of the WA Royalties for 
Regions program are not fully understood, in large part because inadequate data has been made 
available (Mclure, 2008). Furthermore, given the fact that Royalties for Regions was essentially 
based on political need by the (then) WA Government to retain a coalition agreement with the 
National Party, as well as the proportionally much greater urbanisation of the WA population, it 
would be unwise to simply replicate Royalties for Regions in NSW. 
A second hypothecated approach would concentrate exclusively on LGAs in which mining operations 
occurred. In contrast to a ‘broad-brush’ Royalties for Regions modus operandi, it would seek to 
compensate councils in accordance with the demonstrated additional costs which mining had 
imposed on them. This could be done by channelling funds directly from the NSW Government to 
the councils in question - or alternatively through the NSW Local Government Grants Commission - 
by way of augmented grants to these local authorities. Put differently, it would attempt to place 
these local authorities in the circumstances in which they would have found themselves had no 
negative mining externalities existed. 
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Table 4: Additional Per Capita Council Expenditure Associated with Mining Activity, 2012-2015 (all 
regressors) 
 Model 1:  
Per Capita 
Expenditure (ln) - 
Entire State  
Model 2:  
Per Capita 
Expenditure (ln) - 
Outside Sydney 
Metropolitan Area 
Model 3:  
Per Capita 
Expenditure (ln) - 
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0.7483 0.6917 0.8237 
n 152 115 42 
Prob>F 0.0002 0.0360 0.0010 
Standard errors in parentheses. 
+p < 0.10, *p < 0.05, **p < 0.01. 
